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Hallucinatory pictures
Abstract: Hallucinatory pictures are yet to be found picture-like 
artifacts that induce a hallucination of their content that cannot be  
intuitively explained by a look at the structure of the pictorial vehicle.  
Different accounts of depiction make different predictions about the  
possibility that such artifacts be considered as pictures. Some case are  
presented that pint towards the intuitive acceptability of hallucinatory  
pictures.
A hallucinatory picture has not been discovered or invented yet; this is 
why you do not find a figure illustrating it here. But are we conceptually 
prepared for it? 
In this little thought experiment, it is characterized as follows. On a 
surface like a canvas or a sheet of paper, some marks are traced that (if I 
described them to you) would appear  meaningless in the sense that 
nobody would expect them to have a visual semantic whatsoever. But 
whoever actually looks at the artifact almost instantly hallucinates a visual 
content – say, a vivid representation of a dog as seen in a particular light, 
from a particular viewpoint, at a particular distance. How does this come 
about? We are unable to intuitively find in the features of the picture any 
grounding for the fact that by looking at it, we have the impression of 
seeing a dog. This does not look like a photograph of a dog, for instance. 
Scientists have not uncovered the particular visual pathway that is 
activated when looking at the artifact and may never uncover them. 
To make our case a bit more vivid, imagine that a very special occurrence 
of the written word 'dog' is what is marked on the canvas. Nothing in the 
word 'dog' as we know it is such as to make us predict that when we look 
at it, we have the impression of visually hallucinating a dog. We may think 
of a dog by reading the word 'dog', of course, but this is not the type of 
experience at stake; indeed, people who have not learned to read English 
and cannot process latin characters would just be predicted to see a 
scribble here. And yet they too would have the hallucinatory picture 
experience. In our hypothetical hallucinatory picture the marks on the 
canvas have – say – certain intriguing convolutions that by hypothesis we 
would not normally take for the picture of a dog or expect to elicit a visual 
recognition of a dog; however, those convolutions mysteriously unlock 
some mechanisms of the visual brain whose side effect is that you 
hallucinate the dog. 
Hallucinatory pictures are accompanied by a sense of magic, of 
unexplained causation. I called them 'pictures', but are they pictures? 
Under a very broad construal of a recognitional account of pictures 
(Gombrich 1960, Schier 1986), hallucinatory pictures would be pictures. 
On narrower recognitional accounts (Hopkins 1998), or on a structural 
account of pictures (Goodman, 1967; Kulvicki, 2006), they would not. 
Other accounts, such as two-foldness theories of depiction (Wollheim 
1998) may be neutral. 
A recognitional account contemplates the possibility that a picture elicits 
the visual recognitional abilities of the picture's viewer. This particular 
type of response is constitutive of being a picture. In a broad construal, no 
particular constraint is placed on the structure of the marks. What 
matters is just their raw effect on the viewer. No matter how this effect is 
attained, if it is attained, and is the manifestation of a recognitional ability 
with visual content, then the artifact counts as a picture. Indeed, the 
hallucinatory picture case is an generalization of Gombrich's idea of 
pictorial experience as a kind of visual illusion: “The history of art... may 
be described as the forging of master keys for opening the mysterious 
locks of our sense to which only nature herself originally held the key... 
Like the burglar who tries to break a safe, the artist has no direct access to 
the inner mechanisms” (Gombrich, 1960: 359.)
Less broad construals of the recognitional account would impose 
constraints on the syntactic features of the vehicle; for instance, they 
would require that the marks be so arranged as to display some sort of 
similarity with the depicted object. Such requirements, no matter how 
formulated, would bar hallucinatory pictures. Under no description the 
vehicle of a hallucinatory picture displays a resemblance with the content. 
It just triggers a hallucinatory response in the appropriate conditions.
On a structural account, an item counts as a picture if it has a certain 
number of structural properties. The account is useful in distinguishing 
pictures from other types of graphic representations, in particular writing 
systems and diagrams. For instance, a picture's  identity – as opposed to a 
printed character's identity – finely depends on the identity of the marks 
on it (change a line a little bit, and you'll have a different picture; change 
the shape of the letter 'd' a bit, and you still have the word 'dice'.) Pictures 
are moreover syntactically more replete than diagrams, insofar as more 
features are essential to the picture's identity than are to the diagrams 
(change the shape of a line and of a curve, and you'll get a different picture 
and diagram, respectively; and yet you may change the color in a diagram 
without altering its identity, whereas a change in color in a picture is a 
change in the picture's identity.) Hallucinatory pictures are not submitted 
to any of these constraints. They work by making your visual system react 
to features of the artifact that you won't be able to characterize in terms of 
relative repleteness or syntactic sensitivity. 
On a two-foldness account the experience of a picture is the simultaneous 
experience of the content and of what it depicts. Nothing in what has been 
said so far about hallucinatory pictures excludes the possibility that we 
are aware both of the triggering marks and of the hallucinated content. 
We may; or we may not. The two-fold account is neutral to the possibility 
of hallucinatory pictures.
Are hallucinatory pictures conceptual freaks? We have some room for the 
intuition that many actual types of pictures are of the “magic” type. 
Pointillist pictures perform some magic in this sense. You have tiny green 
dots next to tiny red dots, and it has been an interesting discovery that 
from a certain distance you will see no green and red anymore, but an 
expanse of yellow. Line drawings and cartoons perform some such magic 
as well (Cavanagh 1999; Maynard 2005). They trigger recognitional 
abilities by a visual display that does not instantiate many of the 
properties of the recognized objects (objects are not surrounded by thick 
lines, and most visual discontinuity lines are not representable in a line 
drawing.) 
Not only there are many existing graphic artifacts that work in a quasi-
magic way; some can be concocted that are a bit less magic than 
hallucinatory pictures. We have some reasons for calling them all 
'pictorial', but we do not have have the slightest intuition about their 
pictorial powers unless some tricks are performed on the visual system. 
The following is a continuum of real and imaginary cases. 
Stereoscopic pictures are a first example. When they are fused in a single 
view, we hallucinate a rich 3d experience of shapes and colors. The 
stereoscopic 3d is a hallucination. But surely by looking at each image in 
the pair, we still have the impression of seeing a 3d world of forms and 
colors, albeit in a less vivid way? Possibly other artifacts are more 
compelling. A second case are random-dots stereograms; they are such 
that you won't see any object in each display of the pair; only when you 
binocularly fuse the pair, you hallucinate some figures. But surely there is 
something distinctively “graphic” about each set of dots? Hence a third, 
hypothetical case. Suppose a multimodal illusion is discovered such that if 
you monocularly look at one random-dot stereogram in the pair and at 
the same time you are auditorily administered a dose of cunningly 
orchestrated noise, you visually hallucinate the dog. But surely there is at 
least some visually available object here? 
Shouldn't we contemplate the possibility of a hallucinatory picture that 
does not depend on a visually available object? We may want to set some 
limits at this point. If – fourth case, again hypothetical – I acupuncture 
you in such a way that you hallucinate the dog as above, you may resist 
the idea that you are confronted with the picture of a dog. At a minimum, 
we want the pictorial vehicle to be of the same material type as that of 
photographs, canvases, or VR goggles. This minimal requirement is all a 
broad recognitional account needs in order to consider an experience a 
pictorial experience. Hallucinatory pictures are conceptually just one step 
before acupuncture hallucinations.
Most existing accounts of depiction pay due respect to an intuitive notion 
of what counts as a picture.  This is itself is not a blameworthy feature of 
any account. Still, we should be prepared to make interesting discoveries 
that might conflict with our intuitive notion.
Resemblance accounts, or structural accounts, make substantive claims 
about the vehicle. A broad recognitional account is committed to a very 
thin notion of pictorial vehicle. Dropping the vehicle altogether would 
leave us with hallucination only, and no picture. But a good hallucination, 
and a thin vehicle, can constitute a picture.
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